The ambivalence of favour: Paradoxes of Russia's economy of favours by Ledeneva, A
1 
 
The Ambivalence of Favour: Paradoxes of Russia’s Economy of Favours.1 
12,153 
Alena Ledeneva 
Professor of Politics and Society, SSEES/UCL 
Introduction: In the beginning was ... blat! 
 
My ‘discovery’ of economies of favours began with a study of blat – the use of personal 
networks for getting things done in Soviet Russia (Ledeneva 1998). I used the term 
‘economy’ in Polanyi’s sense, to point out the embeddedness of blat in society. The 
‘economy of favours’ referred not only to the circulation of favours  – favours of access to 
the centrally distributed goods, services and privileges – but also to the sociability of blat 
channels, routinely established by friends for tackling shortages and problems. The 
sociability of blat turned favours into an alternative currency of ‘mutual help and 
understanding’ needed for the functioning of non-market economy and embodied frustration 
with the non-consumerist ideology and political constraints of the centralised planning and 
distribution. On the individual level, favours delivered by friends, acquaintances and friends 
of friends granted solutions to small time problems. On a societal level, they represented a 
way out for the Soviet system that struggled to adhere to its own proclaimed principles. A 
discreet re-distribution of resources within social networks – an implicit social contract, 
known as the ‘little deal’ – became part of the solution (Millar 1985).2  
A Russian phrase ‘nel’zya, no mozhno’ (prohibited, but possible) offered a summary 
understanding of the Soviet society with its all-embracing restrictions and the labyrinth of 
possibilities around them (the shops are empty but fridges are full). Blat was an open secret 
for insiders, but a puzzle for outsiders unequipped for handling the ‘doublethink’ associated 
with blat. It was not that a formal ‘no’ necessarily turned into ‘yes’ after pulling some blat 
strings. The formula no+blat=yes is misleading, for it emphasizes the importance of blat but 
downplays the importance of constraints. In the Soviet times, even outsiders could make 
useful friends and mobilise them and their networks to get things done. Yet there was always 
a limit to what friends could do. Sometimes blat worked and sometimes it didn’t. Thus, its 
formula should grasp both ends of the paradox: 
blat=no (shops are empty)  
AND [IF POSSIBLE, insert { ON THE LEFT OF THE TWO EQUASIONS] 
blat=yes (fridges are full)  
No coherent rules about blat economy of favours, which  were predominantly associated with 
access to goods and services in short supply, could be deduced: it was both the formally 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Nicolette Makovicky and David Henig for their comments and the invitation to give a keynote 
address ‘From Russia’s Economy of Favours to Economies of Favour: Conceptual Innovation, Methodological 
Experimentation, and Challenges of Comparison’ to the conference on Economies of Favour After Socialism: A 
Comparative Perspective’ at Wolfson College, University of Oxford in January 2012. I am also grateful to 
Harley Balzer, Gretty Mirdal, Eric Naiman, Stanislav Shekshnia, Florence Weber, Gabriel Abend and my 
colleagues at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Paris for their commentary and help with this chapter.  
2 The ambivalence of this contract was essential for its functioning, for it could easily be withdrawn at any point 
on selective basis by the authorities. People who individually withdrew from it and lived ‘by the book’ were 
ostracised. The logic of the system was to make everyone violate the rules, and thus to become vulnerable. A 
similar logic can be applied to the workings of the centralised planning and its dependence on the industrial 
progress pushers, tolkachi (Berliner 1957). 
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prescribed ‘no’ and the informally pushed ‘yes’ that constituted an ambivalent outcome, 
somewhat dependant on the size and potential of the networks, while also being constraint-
driven, context-bound, uncertain and irregular.  
 Moreover, under conditions of shortage, a positive outcome for one was 
preconditioned by negative outcomes for the others. While the state monopoly of centralised 
distribution created shortages, the monopolisation of blat re-distribution by each particular 
gatekeeper perpetuated these shortages further. The constraints of socialism drove people to 
outwit the centralised distribution system. At the same time the harshness of these constraints 
made it impossible for the regime to fully enforce the existing regulations, which created 
opportunities for brokers to circumvent them. ‘Pushers’ of constraints (tolkachi and 
blatmeisters) created value for themselves and their networks at the expense of less-
opportunistic players. Thus, functionally, blat softened the constraints of the Soviet system 
for some but was dependent on the continuing existence of constraints for others. Working 
with constraints to unleash their enabling power became the preoccupation of experienced 
brokers, who often functioned for the sake of the Soviet system but contrary to the system’s 
own rules. Thus blat functioned in an ambivalent – both productive and non-productive – 
way.  
Obtaining goods and services through blat channels provided just one example of the 
many informal practices that made the Soviet regime more tolerable and, at the same time, 
helped to undermine its political, economic and social foundations. In his Economics of 
Shortage, Janos Kornai theorizes principles of rationing, or the non-price criteria of 
allocation, and forms of allocation of resources (Kornai 1979). Each of these can be 
associated with an informal practice, serving specific needs at various stages in socialist 
development. For example, queuing is associated with practices of absenteeism from a 
workplace (no unemployment, but nobody works), that in late socialism served people’s 
consumption, but also served to alleviate the hardship of queuing and to reduce criticism 
towards the regime, incapable of tackling shortages. Because absenteeism had utility for late 
socialism and could not be ruled out completely, it was prosecuted by authorities in selective 
campaigns, often to signal that the practice went out of proportion or to punish regional and 
local officials, on whose territories the raids for absentees in the shops’ queues were made. 
Selective enforcement, or under-enforcement, became the reverse side of over-regulation. 
The theme of ambivalence became similarly central for the post-communist transition. 
I argue against the stigmatisation of practices that replaced blat during Russia’s dramatic 
break-up with its communist past. Contrary to the assumption that informal practices had to 
disappear once the oppressive system collapsed, I identified new practices that emerged and 
functioned ambivalently in order to serve the transition: they both supported and subverted 
the post-Soviet political, judicial and economic institutions. Newly established in the 1990s 
democratic and market institutions, including competitive elections, free media, independent 
judiciary, and private property rights, became enveloped in informal practices that both 
facilitated their development and undermined it. Practices associated with manipulation of 
electoral campaigns (black public relations or piar), misuse of information and compromising 
materials (kompromat), use of informal control and leverage (krugovaya poruka) in the 
formally independent judiciary, circumventing market-induced economic constraints with 
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barter schemes, non-transparent ownership and creative accounting were the most widespread 
in that period (Ledeneva 2006).  
My initial theorization of blat has also helped in the subsequent exploration of the 
network-based system of informal governance – sistema – under Putin. In periods of stability, 
the ambivalent workings of blat networks at the grassroots are indeed similar to those of 
power networks in sistema, but one important distinction has to be emphasised. If the blat 
‘economy of favours’ had to some extent an equalising effect on the chances of accessing 
resources for networked individuals and thus reduced the privilege gap between insiders and 
outsiders of the centralised distribution system, the trickle-down effect of the present-day 
‘economy of kickbacks’ seems to be reverse: it undermines competition, excludes the 
outsiders, and rewards insiders through network-based allocation and mobilisation. If blat 
networks tended to operate on the basis of obligation perceived as ‘mutual help’, power 
networks tend to operate on the basis of a hierarchical, patron–client logic, associated with 
practices of ‘feeding’ (kormlenie) aimed to enhance the power of the ruler and leave his 
subordinates under his ‘manual control’ (Ledeneva 2013b). This difference also stems from 
the political and economic frameworks in which networks operate. As the Soviet system was 
not economically viable due to its centralisation, rigid ideological constraints, shortages and 
the limited role of money, blat networks had some equalising, ‘weapon of the weak,’ role in 
the oppressive conditions, and to some extent served the economic needs of the central 
distribution system. In Putin’s Russia, power networks operate without those constraints and 
extract multiple benefits from the post-Soviet reforms, while undermining the key principles 
of market competition (equality of economic subjects and security of property rights) and the 
key principle of the rule of law (equality before the law). They are, in effect, the ‘weapon of 
the strong.’ What it lacks in democratic graces, the sistema appears to compensate with the 
effectiveness of its informal incentives, control and capital flows operated by power networks 
and their impressive capacity to mobilise. Reliance on networks enables leaders to mobilise 
and to control, yet they also lock politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen into informal 
deals, mediated interests and personalised loyalties. This is the ‘modernisation trap of 
informality’: one cannot use the potential of informal networks without triggering their 
negative long-term consequences for institutional development (Ledeneva 2013a). The 
similarity of functional ambivalence of both blat and power networks points to an important 
dimension of modernisation: in order to modernise, one should not only change the formal 
rules, but also modernise networks and people’s attitudes to favours of access for ‘svoi’ at all 
levels. Networks through which favours are channelled, and their functional ambivalence, are 
central for the understanding of economies of favours and should be viewed in specific 
contexts. For the purpose of creating a typology of favours and generalising about 
ambivalence, I chose the specific case of the Soviet ‘economy of favours,’ characterised by 
‘favours of access,’ given and received by blat.    
Typology of favours 
In its sociological sense, ambivalence, in the definition of Robert Merton (1976), refers to 
incompatible normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour. The incompatibility 
is assigned to a status and the social structures that generate the circumstances in which 
ambivalence is embedded (1976: 6-7). Merton’s analysis of sociological ambivalence stems 
from Peterim Sorokin’s statement that actual social relations are predominantly of one type or 
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another, rather than comprising pure types, and points out that “it is precisely the matter of 
not confining our attention to the dominant attributes of a role or social relation that directs us 
to the function and structure of sociological ambivalence” (Merton 1976: 16). The core type 
of sociological ambivalence puts contradictory demands upon the occupants of a status in a 
particular social relation. Since these norms cannot be simultaneously expressed in 
behaviour, they come to be expressed in an oscillation of behaviours: of detachment and 
compassion, of discipline and permissiveness, of personal and impersonal treatment” (Merton 
1976: 8). Merton gives example of professions, such as doctors, managers or academics, 
characterised by the oscillating occurrence of compassion, permissiveness and preferential 
treatment, on the one hand, and of detachment, discipline and impersonal treatment, on the 
other. Merton’s principles of ambivalence, operationalized as clashing attitudes or oscillating 
behaviours, in my view, are essential for the understanding of favours given and received 
under pressure of oppressive regimes.  
As depicted in the Oxford English dictionary, for an action to be a favour, it should 
deviate from a norm (‘beyond what is due or usual’) and from a rigid obligation to give, to 
receive and, most importantly, to reciprocate. For a giver, the ambivalence of favour lies in 
doing something deviating from ‘normal’ while also sustaining the norm – making an 
exception that only proves the rule. For a receiver, accepting a favour implies neither an 
obligation to return it, nor its oblivion. Rather, the motion is left ambivalent, until a further 
context provides an incentive to extract the memory of a ‘good turn’ from a limbo and to 
consider another. Moreover, the ambivalence about the meaning, value and obligation to 
return favours, when shared by parties, can be complicated further when the meaning, value 
and function of favours are disagreed upon by parties (the giver vs. the receiver), and 
especially when the normative perceptions of a favour shared by participants (the giver and 
the receiver) are different from those of observers.  
Switching between a participant’s and an observer’s positions, conceptualised as the 
blat ‘misrecognition game,’ enables one to develop an ambivalent attitude to blat, so it is 
generally despised but also ubiquitously practiced. In other words, the blat ‘misrecognition 
game’ is not only about misrecognising the ‘reality’ of the use of friendship, parallel to 
Bourdieu’s logic of misrecognition of the reciprocation of gift. It is also about the game of 
psychological ‘hide and seek’ – a domain of Orwell’s ‘doublethink’ and a case of 
‘misrecognised’ double standards – switching sets of norms depending on whether one was 
inside or outside of a favour: accepted when received by oneself, yet resented when received 
by others. Such elusiveness of blat made it pervasive, yet difficult for data collection.   
Data on favours are context-bound, there is no final interpretation of favour, rather 
there is a range of interpretations dependent on the teller and the timing of telling: whether 
one is a giver or receiver, participant or observer, whether a favour has been 
given/reciprocated, whether the relationship between parties has existed before and continued 
afterwards. In other words, the relationship (with its constraints and opportunities) has to be 
brought into consideration. But if one has to abstract the most important characteristic of 
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favour, I would argue, it is the ambivalence: eluding while also alluding to the features of free 
gift and self-serving exchange, of network-driven endowment and self-generated investment.3  
I differentiate between types of ambivalence associated with level of analysis and data 
collection: favours (what they are), favours of access (what they do) and economies of favour 
(how they are justified). Firstly, the substantive ambivalence of favours is determined by the 
impossibility to define the predominant type of favour, resulting from the uncertainty of its 
meaning, value and obligation that it creates. Secondly, there is the functional ambivalence, 
whereby certain types of favours, favours of access, originate in contradictory structural 
constraints, operate in discretionary areas, and play a contradictory role – subversive but also 
supportive – in circumventing but also supporting the formal and informal constraints that 
frame them. Thirdly, there is normative ambivalence towards economies of favours, whereby 
both individuals and governments rely on economies of favours, but also deny their 
engagement, criticize economies of favours but also turn a blind eye to them where 
convenient. Commonly known as double standards, such normative ambivalence enables 
seamless crossing of boundaries, which are themselves drawn in a circumstantial way.  
For the purpose of accommodating such complexity and context-bound nature of 
favours, I define favour as an ambivalent action that involves sharing or re-distribution of 
material or nonmaterial resources driven by material or nonmaterial incentives, associated 
with maintaining, or extending, social relations. I integrate social relations – ideal types of 
networks – into the typology of favours, which is depicted on Figure 1, and aim at reflecting 
layers, levels and angles of ambivalence.  
The ideal types of favours, pictured towards the margins of the diagram, are 
determined by whether a favour is provided from personally shared/private or re-
distributed/public resources, and by the type of incentives that the parties claim or are 
perceived to have. They are the ideal types (yet also raising issues of objectivity and 
subjectivity in drawing the boundaries) and therefore appear outside the circle of 
ambivalence, pictured towards the centre of the diagram.  
The circle contains intermittently displayed features of favours, inseparable from 
social relationships/ types of networks. It is the latter that determines the predominant type of 
favour, yet there is also room for ambivalence in its features, oscillating between free gift and 
self-interested exchange, between a transfer in the form of endowment and a transaction in 
the form of self-driven investment. The ‘twirl’ of substantive ambivalence of favour is 
indicated by the circular arrow in the centre of the diagram.  
The borderlines between four quarters of the circle, depicting ideal types of networks, 
appear as a blurred line indicating that networks do not have clear boundaries or prescribed 
                                                          
3 Youth is often given favours because they belong to a certain family, clan, circle, network 
etc. as illustrated in the example of Mongolian school graduate seeking to enter university 
(Humphrey ibid: 29). Humphrey also points out that favours can create kinship or friendship 




modes of functioning (more on functional ambivalence in Figure 2) and that favours rely on 
the ambivalent norms and boundaries (more on normative ambivalence in Box 2).  
Figure 1. Typology of favours, given and received. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
If we look at any economy of favours through the lens of this typology of favours, we can 
envisage it as a circulation of favours, a system, made up, in real time, of unreciprocated 
favours, given and received in different directions, inseparable from social networks, and 
often mediated by kin, friends, acquaintances or brokers. No one is motivated by clearly 
defined incentives, and no favour is rigidly determined by the type of network, incentive or 
resource – the fluidity is an essential characteristic of the economy of favours that enables 
them to operate smoothly and dodge regulation. 
In the discourse of modernity, ambivalence is associated with fragmentation and 
failure of manageability. Zygmunt Bauman defines ambivalence as the possibility of 
assigning an object or an event to more than one category and views it as a language-specific 
disorder. The main symptom of disorder is the acute discomfort we feel when we are unable 
to read the situation properly and to choose between alternative actions (Bauman 1991: 1, 
12). Bauman lists ambivalence among “the tropes of the ‘other’ of order: ambiguity, 
uncertainty, unpredictability, illogicality, irrationality, ambivalence, brought about by 
modernity with its desire to organise and to design” (Bauman 1991: 7). Ambivalence thus 
implies a form of disorder and negativity. In my view, ambivalence can be singled out from 
the Bauman’s list for its bi-polarity, oscillating duality (both order and disorder; both 
positivity and negativity), and relative clarity of the polar positions. It is a social counterpart 
of emotional ambivalence in psychology (love-hate) or materials with ambivalent qualities in 
physics (semiconductors). In other words, it is a situation of co-exiting thesis and anti-thesis, 
without certainty of their synthesis, yet without uncertainty as to what co-existing views, 
attitudes and beliefs are. The latter qualification would not apply to ambivalence in 
psychoanalysis, where is often associated with ambiguity. For the purposes of the following 
discussion of substantive, functional and normative ambivalence of favours, I distinguish the 
concept of ambivalence from ambiguity in the following ways: 
 Ambivalence is bi-polar, not multi-polar as is the case with ambiguity. 
 The poles (thesis and anti-thesis) are clearly defined.  
 There is little uncertainty as to what co-existing views, attitudes and beliefs are. The 
uncertainty is created by the unpredictability of their actualisation. 
 The incompatibility of constituents of the ambivalence is different from duplicity, 
from the deliberate deceptiveness in behaviour or speech, or from double-dealing. 
 When moulded by the clashing constraints, ambivalence can result in doublethink 
ability (the illogical logic), dual functionality (functionality of the dysfunctional) and 
double standards (for us and for them).  
 The ambivalence is best understood through the paradoxes it produces, such as the 
role of hackers in advancing cybersecurity, for example, and can be identified by 
looking into the open secrets of societies (Ledeneva 2011a, 2011b).  
Let us consider the angles of ambivalence in more detail for the case of the Soviet economy 
of favours.     
 




In this paper, substantive ambivalence is defined by the impossibility of synthesis and the 
possibility of doublethink. The logic of substantive ambivalence presumes that, contrary to 
the one of synthesis, thesis and anti-thesis cannot be reconciled. Instead, they co-exist in a 
‘doublethink’ fashion, whereby both are relevant, and in this sense no longer constitute 
‘either-or’ oppositions. In his classic novel 1984, Orwell defines doublethink as the power of 
holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously:  
The Party intellectual knows in which direction his memories must be altered; he 
therefore knows that he is playing tricks with reality; but by the exercise of doublethink 
he also satisfies himself that reality is not violated. . . . [T]he essential act of the Party is 
to use conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose that goes with 
complete honesty. . . . To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them . . . all this 
is indispensably necessary (quoted in Levada 2001: 17). 
For a long time, ambivalence was treated as little more than a measurement error, but in 
recent years, scholars have been taking our grey areas more seriously (Leslie 2013). Frenk 
van Harreveld, of the University of Amsterdam’s Uncertainty Lab, found that the students in 
the ambivalent condition were deeply uncomfortable about settling on a view, and that this 
discomfort only increased once they had committed. They literally sweated over their 
decision. Van Harreveld explained that, for the ambivalent person, committing to a position, 
even though the decision has no consequence, is inevitably painful: “If you believe two 
things at once and you’re forced to give one up, then you will experience a sense of loss” 
(Leslie 2013). Similarly, it is not unthinkable that not committing to a position of integrity 
can be associated with certain advantages.   
The idea of substantive ambivalence has been explored by social anthropologists, 
although not explicitly stated in these terms. Caroline Humphrey effectively argues for the 
ambivalence of favour, when stating that a ‘given action can be both a transaction and a 
favour’ (Humphrey 2012, 33). Laidlaw, following Derrida, illustrates the inherent paradox of 
a gift, and questions the definition of gift as necessarily reciprocal and non-alienated. Like the 
pure commodity, the pure gift is characterized by the fact that it does not create personal 
connections and obligations between the parties (Laidlaw 2000).4 “So some transactions both 
are and are not free gifts, and the idea of the gift is, as Derrida has shown, anyway unstable 
and paradoxical, can be made to work in two quite contrary ways at once” (Derrida, quoted in 
Laidlaw 2000). As Florence Weber rightly observes, “some see in the maussian gift the very 
essence of the gift, namely its extreme ambivalence, whereas others only view it as source of 
confusion between simple transfers and transactions (Testart 2007); some consider the 
maussian gift to be a paradigm (Caillé 2000), whereas others interpret it as merely one of the 
forms of nonmarket services” (Weber 2012: 3). In The Gift, according to Weber, Marcel 
Mauss has described the entire series of nonmarket services in all their diversity, without 
                                                          
4 Gregory claims that reciprocal dependence is inherent in gift, thus creating its ‘inalienability’, as opposed to 
reciprocal independence and ‘alienability’ of commodity (Gregory 1982). To confront the Gregory 
conceptualisation of gift vs. commodity, Laidlaw analyses the traditional practice of gocari, householders seek 
to maximize their gift out of devotion, and the desire to perform a good karma, and so gain merit. For 
renouncers, the priority is to avoid anything that compromises their autonomy. These apparently conflicting 
purposes are mutually reinforcing (Laidlaw 1995: 314-23). 
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however always clearly drawing the borders between phenomena still to be established in 
ethnographic terms (Ibid.). It is the ambivalence of such borders for the case of the favour 
that I aim at reflecting in my typology of favours. On the one hand, this typology fits well 
with the recent advancement made in the ethnography of nonmarket transactions (Humphrey 
2012; Sneath 2006; Testart 2007; Zelizer 2005; Weber 2000, 2012) that lead one to 
distinguish clearly the two forms of services: transaction and transfer, as represented by left 
and right hemispheres (see Figure 1). On the other hand, it emphasises the ambivalence of 
favour that can be considered as free from exchange in every particular instance, but also 
carrying potential for reciprocation; as a transfer, but also a transaction.  
Due to their substantive ambivalence, the Soviet favours of access are hard to locate on a 
Sahlin’s ‘continuum’, or a ‘spectrum’ of reciprocities, “ranging from pure gift … to barter 
and theft which are each an attempt to get something for nothing with impunity” (Sahlins 
1972:195). In certain circumstances favours of access resemble a pure gift, in others – a gift, 
characterised by reciprocal dependence, which engenders regard for and trust in the other 
over the long-term. Moreover, favours can be asymmetrical as an endowment or investment 
(a mother looks after her daughter’s child or lends jewellery to wear; neighbour A walks B’s 
dog together with one’s own) as well as symmetrical as in tit-for-tat barter or commodity 
exchange (A walks neighbour B’s dog, while B looks after A’s flat during business trips). But 
even if we were able to establish the nature of reciprocity, or the lack of thereof, in a favour, 
we would miss its raison d’etre: a favour is meant to remain ambivalent, displaying features 
of a free gift, endowment, investment or self-interested exchange (as outlined in Figure 1), 
and often in a contradictory and mutually exclusive way. Articulation or reflection may 
distort the practice. 
Let us consider an example. A neighbour shares cooked food with her neighbour, an 
elderly actress, who lives by herself, beyond her means, only occasionally being visited by 
relatives and not receiving enough support from them. The neighbour’s help is selfless, she 
admires the former celebrity, she does not feel obliged to help in any way and does not expect 
any return, yet she is also resentful towards the actress’s son and relatives, not picking up the 
cost of a permanent carer, whose functions she effectively performs.5 Her favours are 
ambivalent in the sense in which a free gift and endowment (among us) and self-interested 
exchange and investment (among them) are representative of the fluid nature of contexts 
emerging in their neighbourly relationship. In majority of them, a caring neighbour of the 
actress uses her own resources for providing favours. Had the women were related, we could 
have not considered the described actions as favours. As Humphrey points out in her 
Mongolian case, favours are different from Sneath’s case of family help – the so-called 
enactment – as they are not the manifestation of obligation and do not consist of the 
enactment of previously established relationships (Sneath 2006). Among family and friends, 
favours are not necessarily exchanges. Their moral value is derived from not being 
reciprocated. The reciprocal considerations, however, can emerge when the relationship is 
                                                          
5 RTR-Planeta, A show on the loneliness of the elderly, with Tatiana Samoilova, a Soviet movie star, Oscar for 
Letyat Zhuravli, who called in to say that she only has 100 roubles in her pocket.    
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broken (Boltanski 1990).6 The personal context and societal constraints construe the 
subjective and objective parameters of favours.   
 In the Soviet economy of favours, favours often involved re-distribution of public (or 
non-personal) resources for providing personalised help, which placed such actions on the 
borderline with practices of embezzlement, pilfering and routine misuse of resources. Yet the 
societal constraints, specifically the illegitimacy of the private property, legitimised the use of 
the public property. Blat favours were commonly aimed at obtaining food, goods and services 
to which people were entitled. It made such favours easier to receive, especially that they 
were associated with non-monetary incentives. Moreover, the sense of entitlement provided 
legitimacy to those involved in giving, receiving or exchanging favours. Those who did not 
or could not become involved, however, emphasized the inequality and unfairness of blat. 
For participants, favours of access merged with patterns of care and sociability to such an 
extent that people were often unable to distinguish, for example, friendship from the use of 
friendship. Such dual nature of blat was preconditioned by subjective and objective, informal 
and formal constraints. The informal code of friendship in socialist societies (to give away 
your last shirt to a friend) made the boundaries between relationship and the use of 
relationship blurred. The formal constraints of socialism – where the public and private 
property balance was distorted, the money did not function fully and the alternative 
currencies of exchange created symbiotic relationship with the economy of shortage – 
allowed favours of access to be exchanged at the expense of the public resources and served 
to compensate for the deficiencies of the centralised system of distribution.  
Box 1. The blurred boundaries between sociability and instrumentality 
For the purpose of the ideal types, it is possible to establish a borderline to distinguish between friendship and 
blat (the use of friendship) – if a help to a friend comes from one’s own pocket, it is help of a friend, if a help to 
a friend comes at the expense or through redistribution of public resources, it is a favour of access. The nature of 
formal constraints, the lack of private property or clear divisions between the public and the private in socialist 
societies, provides a degree of entitlement to whatever the economy of favours has to offer. As opposed to 
favours given, received or exchanged at the expense of personal resources, an economy of favours implies that a 
favour-giver is not only a giver but also a gatekeeper or a broker benefiting from the position of access and 
discretionary powers. It is also often the case that a favour-recipient is not only a beneficiary of a re-distributed 
object or service, delivered by a friend, a friend of a friend or a broker, but also a recipient of what s/he is 
entitled to have. In other words, a favour does not produce an outcome visibly different from that achieved in 
other ways (inheriting, rationing, queuing, purchasing in black market), which makes defining the boundaries 
even more difficult to establish. 
To complicate matters further, the difference between sociability and instrumentality is defined not 
only by the source of resources (private or public) but also by the incentive (material or non-material). In turn, 
non-material incentives may include all kinds of moral or emotional gains and losses. Apart from grace, noted 
by Julian Pitt-Rivers (2011) and Humphrey (Ibid.), dignity and humiliation can certainly be brought into the 
discussion of non-material incentives. In literary sources, Eric Naiman observes, they seem to undergird just 
about every act of giving and receiving, and the recipient's sense of self-worth (dignity) and the degree of 
resentment he experiences, even – and perhaps especially – towards those who do the most for him are essential 
components in the understanding of the meaning and consequences of any favour. The sense of daily frustration 
                                                          
6 Luc Boltanski (1990) distinguishes between regimes l’amour (with reciprocity defined by an affectionate 
relationship) and la justice (reciprocity as defined within the broken relationship, in divorce). When discussing 
reciprocity of the exchange of favours I follow his logic and introduce regime of affection, regime of 
equivalence, and regime of status (Ledeneva 1998: 144-155).  
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surrounding the material aspects of much late-Soviet life surely had an impact on the giving and receiving of 
favours, and their perception.  
 
As it has been mentioned in the introduction, the issues of blurred boundaries and 
clashing constraints are not exclusive to socialism or post-socialism (see, for example, 
Jeremy Morris (2013) and Sabina Stan’s discussion of ‘neither commodities nor gifts’ in the 
context of post-socialist informal exchanges in the Romanian healthcare system (2012)). In a 
wider sense, such issues can be reframed in terms of the emergence of an anonymous 
individual, operational in market systems, or in terms of transformation from limited access 
to open access societies that implies certain hurdles of law enforcement and limitations for 
the elites to be overcome (North, Wallis and Weingast 2006). In a narrower sense, in order to 
understand the contexts conducive to economies of favours, one should find oneself in a 
situation, where due to its formal and informal constraints, it is impossible to be a good 
brother and a good bureaucrat simultaneously, or where it is possible for a favour to have 
contradictory outcomes (good for one, bad for another; good in a short term, bad in a long 
term; to alleviate but also to aggravate shortages). In what follows, I argue that the key to the 
understanding of functional ambivalence lies in the ambivalence of social networks, which 
operate differently under different constraints and certainly play a central role in mastering 
mutually exclusive constraints.  
 
Functional ambivalence of networks: functionality of the dysfunctional 
Clashing constraints can transform the logic of opposition. The analytical constructs, such as 
gift and commodity, the public and the private, material and non-material incentives, fit well 
with ideal types but they have to be superseded in order to grasp the relationship of functional 
ambivalence. Economies of favours are particularly elusive and difficult to categorise due to 
the fact that social relationships infer their instrumental use, non-material incentives are 
intertwined with material ones, and the boundaries between the public and the private 
resources are blurred, probably more so in some societies than others. On the one hand, in 
many societies kinship ties may entitle you to a yearly supply of potatoes, free baby-care, 
child-raising by babushki, as well as automatic help with all key life choices, such as 
education, jobs, medical care and other types of endowments, through what David Sneath 
calls an ‘enactment’ of social relations (2006). Such social norms, as Caroline Humphrey 
rightly observed, would rule out such transfers of resources, from the domain of favours 
(Humprey Ibid). On the other hand, in societies with much clearer divide between personal 
and collective, between the private and the public, even a little investment of personal time, 
inclusion into a personal network, or sharing expertise that seem non-material and non-
public, can be viewed as a favour and can become associated with favouritism, ‘self-
interested,’ and not fully private actions, especially where provided by people in positions of 
power and/or at the expense of other recipients. Just as an occasional unreciprocated favour 
may one day become reciprocated (in a long cycle of reciprocity, one can repay the favour 
received from an older colleague by giving it to a younger colleague; those who have been on 
the receiving end of kindness of strangers are themselves more likely to show kindness) or, 
indeed, develop into a regular exchange of favours, under certain conditions, favours can be 
routinely channelled by social networks and develop into an ‘economy of favours.’ I argue 
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that constraints associated with central planning, shortages and rationing produce an 
‘economy of favours’ that is essential for the functioning of political, economic and social 
systems, and thus is much more intense in scale and functionality.  
Some pointers to such conditions are hidden in a popular proverb “do not have 
hundred roubles, have hundred friends.” It is meant to emphasize the non-material (moral and 
emotional) importance of relationships, but also has developed connotations of the getting 
access to goods and services in short supply. In the planned economy money has played a 
limited role because of the underdeveloped markets, which placed additional emphasis on the 
non-market transactions. Similarly, in developed market economies favours are both 
relationship-based and instrumental for circumventing the existing constraints (Sandel 2012; 
Larson-Walker 2013), yet the nature of constraints makes a difference. Whether driven by 
scarcity or surplus, there are pockets of society where friends, friends of friends and other 
gatekeepers capable of sharing access are all-important, and where favours of access are 
routinely provided and channelled by social networks. It can be envisaged as a social network 
of gatekeepers, who either open their gates of access when needed by those they care about, 
or use their own time and resources for sociability, thus also creating or maintaining their 
social networks. The hidden part of such sociability is its potential to generate a return, to 
create incentives for keeping the gates shut unless there is a prospect of a return, and to 
generate divisions into ‘us’ and ‘them,’ thus entailing exclusion and unfairness.7  
When gatekeeping is associated with a position in official hierarchy (with access to 
public resources), granting a favour is not defined by personal choice. It is shaped by the dual 
pressure on a bureaucrat: on the one hand, formal responsibility to perform certain duties and 
follow rules according to organisational or professional code, delegated by the principal, and 
on the other hand, informal responsibility for personal networks, friends, family, and the peer 
pressure of the social circle. A cross-country variation in the combinations of formal and 
informal constraints is substantial. There are societies where it is possible to be a good 
bureaucrat and a good brother at the same time, but there are societies where it is not possible 
and one has to navigate around both sets of constraints in order to keep both the job and the 
network. Economies of favours tend to develop in circumstances of conflicting formal and 
informal constraints, so that social networks not only become instrumental for individuals but 
also assist the workings of institutions. 
Box 2. The blurred boundaries between economies of favours and corrupt societies  
The resemblance of blat favours aimed at circumventing formal rules and procedures – manipulating access to 
resources through direct purchase as in bribery or diverting of public resources for personal gain – makes them a 
member of a wider family of informal practices and complicates the matter of drawing the boundaries between 
favours and corrupt exchanges (Ledeneva 1998: 39-59). It also raises the question whether blat was in fact a 
dysfunctional corrupt practice. This may be the case in certain contexts but it is also misleading, for neither blat 
nor corruption have a clear or single meaning, nor are these terms independent of normative, context-free 
judgement (Ledeneva 2009b). According to Lampert (1984: 371), cases of corruption have a ranking specific to 
the society. The Soviets clearly felt that bribery was a worse form of corruption than a small scale use of public 
                                                          
7 Favours of access is a concept relevant for regimes with state centralised distribution systems but it 
may become relevant in other types of regimes where the state plays a central role in the bailout of private 
financial institutions (the 2008 financial crisis in Russia has certainly put businesses in a queue for a bailout). In 
fully-fledged markets, as portrayed by Jeremy Rifkin (2000), the institution of ownership gradually transforms 
into the life-long access to services, so one can envisage the relevance of economies of favours for access to 
nearly every aspect of human life. 
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resources for private ends (such as using workers to do private jobs in enterprise time). Cultural connotations of 
money as ‘dirty’ made non-monetary transactions fairly legitimate (Humphrey, 2000). This was in tune with the 
distinction drawn between various forms of offence in the Criminal Code and the different penalties for 
engaging in them (Heinzen 2007). Blat was not on the criminal scale at all and could not strictly speaking be 
characterized as illegal (by reason of its small scale or recognized necessity (voiti v polozhenie)), thus falling in 
the category of ‘good’ or ‘ambiguous’ corruption (see also Krastev 2004). The oppressive nature of the 
communist regime, and its centralized way of distribution of goods and privileges, introduces another twist in 
interpretation of the nature of blat practices: if blat corrupted the corrupt regime, can we refer to it as 
corruption? With these considerations in mind, to equate blat and corruption in Soviet conditions is to 
misunderstand the nature of Soviet socialism.  
 
It is tempting to argue that blat subverted the Soviet system, and thus should be held 
responsible for undermining its principles and foundations leading to the ultimate collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Yet blat also served the needs of socialist system, and thus supported its 
existence, operating contrary to the system’s own acclaimed principles. Such functionality of 
the dysfunctional applies, for example, to the role of hackers in advancing cybersecurity 
(Ledeneva 2000; Assange et al. 2012) Apart from the ambivalent relationship (subversive/ 
supportive) with the Soviet institutions, blat produced a similar bearing on personal 
relationships – people were forced to use their personal networks instrumentally and that  
instrumentality helped to sustain those networks. The functionality of networks might be 
interesting to explore as they help identify universal features of economies of favours, if 
understood as the use of social networks for getting things done.  
 Social networks are intrinsically ambivalent in their functions: it is impossible to decide 
whether they serve or undermine the functioning of structures and individuals, unless in a 
very narrow context. They do both, simultaneously, and can do one only together with the 
other. My ideal types of functions below, based on analytical distinctions of strong and weak 
ties, and private and public contexts, in which networks operate, serve to frame the fluid, 
blurry and fundamentally ambivalent functionality of networks. Networks can produce a 
variety of outcomes in their ‘social back-up,’ ‘safety net,’ ‘survival kit,’ and the ‘weapon of 
the weak’ functions, corresponding to their downsides: ‘free-riding,’ ‘lock-in effect,’ 
‘limiting individual rights,’ and ‘path dependency.’ Each function in Figure 2 is coupled with 
its dysfunction illustrating an ambivalence of the outcome that networks can produce: back-
up/free-riding; safety net/lock-in effect; survival kit/limited rights; weapon of the weak/path 
dependency (Ledeneva 2013: 65).   
Figure 2. Functional ambivalence of networks 
[insert Figure 2.ppt around here] 
When we interpret this figure for the conditions of Soviet socialism and its economy of 
shortage, for example, the boundaries between the public and the private, between weak ties 
and strong ties are particularly blurry. Correspondingly, sociability of social networks and 
their instrumental use often become blurred. Kin and friends, and in late socialism even 
acquaintances, are expected to provide each other with access to goods and services in short 
supply (a survival kit) and to help out in other ways. Networking acquires connotations of the 
pragmatic use of networks, not necessarily self-serving but serving the interests of a network 
and reducing individual rights (limited rights). Along with a social support (back-up 
function), personal networks also provide unauthorized use of family, network or institutional 
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resources, thereby forming patterns of parasitism between individuals and institutions, private 
and public domains, society and the state (free-riding). Networks of gatekeepers, upon which 
the economies of favours rely, operate with such intensity that blat can be effectively thought 
of as the know-how of the Soviet system and the reverse side of its over-controlling centre 
(the weapon of the weak). The way they tackle the economic, political, ideological and social 
pressures of the socialist system effectively meant that the system could work against its own 
proclaimed principles.  
The functional ambivalence of Russia’s economy of favours has, to some extent, 
solved the double puzzle in the history of authoritarian regimes: how people survived in an 
economy of shortage, and how the regime survived under the same constraint. The Soviet 
case has opened an avenue for exploring the nature of other political and economic regimes 
from a new perspective—the perspective of functional ambivalence of economies of favours 
and associated informal practices. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, practices that have 
replaced blat have sustained the functional ambivalence by supporting but also subverting 
new post-Soviet institutions that emerged in the 1990s (Ledeneva, 2006). 
The functional ambivalence of economies of favours is linked to a number of complex 
issues, associated with their divisive nature (us and them); competitive advantages they offer 
to certain networks but not others, thus implying inequality and unfairness; the compensatory 
role for the shortcomings of formal institutions while diverting their purpose (need and 
greed); their capacity for mitigating crises associated with personal and societal changes, 
while also slowing down the reforms. Functional ambivalence is not sufficiently researched 
and understood. Some reasons are linked to intellectual discomfort and methodological 
limitations for tackling functional ambivalence. Others are of pragmatic nature: it is difficult 
to study economies of favours due to the normative ambivalence around them.   
Normative ambivalence: the phenomenological lens  
If in Bauman’s terms, the ambivalence of favour could be associated with the linguistic 
disorder and the discomfort of attaching it to a single category, as discussed in the section of 
substantive ambivalence, the ambivalence of economies of favour is related to a 
psychological ‘hide-and-seek’ game that enables us to read our own situation in a self-serving 
way, while applying stricter standards to others. A normative ambivalence of economies of 
favour could be best imagined as the phenomenological lens that can focus either on figure or 
background, thus highlighting different ends of the ‘sociability-instrumentality’ stick. When 
focused on a figure, a particular relationship, the lens brings care and altruism to the 
foreground, when focused on the background, it highlights utility and self-interest. What is 
genuinely recognised as help, disinterested giving, grace or kindness close-up can also be 
misrecognised as a value-creating transaction or alternative currency as seen from afar. In the 
Soviet ‘doublethink’, perpetual switching of perspectives enabled one to engage in blat 
practices and at the same time to distance oneself from them. In other words, the blat 
‘misrecognition game’ was not only about misrecognising the ‘reality’ of the usefulness of 
friendship, parallel to Bourdieu’s logic of misrecognition of the reciprocation of the gift. It 
was also about the game of switching positions and oscillating norms towards a favour 
depending on whether one is an insider or outsider: accepted when received by oneself, yet 
disapproved overall and when received by others. 
 Box 3. Crossing the boundaries by oscillating between double standards. 
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The intermediation of blat is essential to protect one’s positive and altruistic self-image and to misrecognise 
one’s own experiences: one helps a friend, not oneself, and that friend returns a favour eventually. Both parties 
maintain a ‘good friend’ self-image while using public resources for ‘non-selfish’ purposes. When the moral 
norms prescribe that one must help a friend but also that blat is immoral and unethical, the normative 
ambivalence – the partial ‘misrecognition game’ – is the way out. 
Selfless re-distribution of public funds for a moral cause is not likely to be seen as self-serving, or 
corrupt. And yet, where there is a potential of mutuality, sociability breeds instrumentality. Selflessness of 
favours, or disinterested giving, is an essential feature of an economy of favours: ‘I favour your interests, you 
favour mine, and we are both selfless and non-interested in material gain individuals.’ Acting sociably, for a 
non-material and/or non-personal gain, allows the giver not to cross the borderline of a corrupt exchange, while 
the recipient of material gain is not in the position to re-direct public resources and technically does nothing 
wrong. Where a ‘favour of access’ involves the misuse of public office, the self-image is ‘rescued’ from being 
corrupt by an altruistic incentive and the lack of direct private gain.   
  
The normative ambivalence serves the situations of moral or logical squeeze and helps to deal 
with the paradoxes of the system, and in this particular case to allow personal engagement in 
blat practices while blaming others engaging in them. “Blat is everywhere but what I do is 
not blat” is the key defensive narrative of individual respondents (Ledeneva 1998: 60; see 
also Sneath 2006 on the Mongolian case). At the level of the Soviet system, a satirical 
magazine Krokodil promoted the narrative of the “grand misrecognition game”: when one did 
it – engaged in blat and other unofficial practices – it had nothing to do with socialism. 
Although in humorous format, Krokodil could not help being part of the political repressive 
machinery designed to introduce and reinforce moral/political standards.  
Blat exchanges of early socialism have matured into a fully-fledged economy of 
favours and become an open secret of late socialism, alongside its other competences:  “to 
read between the lines,” “to see through the façade,” “to beat the system”, that enabled the 
reproduction of daily interactions without pressure of recognition of one’s own compromised 
behaviour or the failures of the system. It allowed people to get on with their daily lives and 
helped the system to reproduce itself. A society of double standards and open secrets was 
thus formed.    
Although the social competence of handling open secrets and dealing with situations 
of moral ambiguity or ethical squeeze are largely invisible for outsiders, I argue that the 
normative ambivalence can be spotted in what I call a ‘knowing smile’ (Ledeneva 2011a), I 
have seen  many of these while researching the economy of favours. Knowing smiles are 
partially about smiling, partially about knowing; partially about knowing, partially about not 
knowing yet being able to go on without questioning. A knowing smile signals the 
competence that includes a certain degree of cynicism, tacit knowledge about what is normal, 
the so-called ability ‘to go on,’ enhanced by skills of doublethink, misrecognition and turning 
formal constraints to one’s advantage. A knowing smile implies ambivalence about the idea 
of being honest, upright, and dedicated to official goals, holding these values, while also 
maintaining a distance from them. Independence, individualism, civic rights in totalitarian 
societies are channelled through doublethink. “Someone who readily believes whatever 
official discourse says has no independent thought” (Yang 1994).  
The knowing smile—whether as a sign of recognition, misrecognition, or both— 
indicates some release from the grip of totalitarian ideologies, which are aimed at the 
transformation of human nature (Arendt 1973: 458), yet it could also be seen as a sign of such 
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transformation. It becomes irrelevant whether people believed official ideological messages 
or not. Instead, the relation to the officialdom became based on intricate strategies of 
simulated support and on ‘nonofficial’ practices (Yurchak 1997: 162; see also Zinoviev’s 
novels). Individual doublethink develops into collective double standards that imply the 
ability to hold contradictory views in private and in public and the capacity of switching 
between them smoothly, when applied to ‘us’ and ‘them,’ to ‘ordinary citizens’ and to the 
Party leaders, to one’s personal circle and to society as a whole. Double standards continued 
to dominate in the post-Soviet era.  
At the individual level, the whole system of deals made with the state, which was 
intrinsic to the Soviet arrangement, inevitably led to moral corruption, the acceptance 
of sham, the padding of figures, string pulling, bribery, and doublethink. These 
conditions were necessary if society and the economy were to function. The collapse 
of the Soviet system did not introduce anything fundamentally new; it only eliminated 
the social and institutional (punitive) regulators that had limited the effect of the 
corrupting mechanisms (Levada 2001: 9).  
Post-Soviet surveys provide numerical evidence of the ambivalence of public opinion in 
Russia (see Levada Centre annual report, 2012). Yet practicing double standards, no doubt, is 
a universal phenomenon, not restricted to the totalitarian doublethink or to its late Soviet and 
post-Soviet reincarnations. Where favours are granted to produce and reproduce the 
boundaries between those included (svoi) and those excluded (chuzhie), the oscillating 
behaviour of providing or not providing favours tend to result in double standards and have 
implications for personal integrity. The manipulative use of the formal rules and using them 
to one’s own personal advantage may be particularly strong in repressive systems but is not 
limited to them. This is illustrated by the studies of favouritism, crony capitalism, corruption 
and rent-seeking behaviour in the Middle East, Asian, Latin American and African resource-
rich economies, as well as in the recent analyses of the 2008 sub-prime crisis elsewhere (i.e. 
Sassen 2012; Puffer et al. 2013). In this chapter, I discussed ambivalence in the context of 
economies of favours but the theme of ambivalence is much wider. Bauman links 
ambivalence to modernity, and Sloterdijk associates modernity with a universal trend of 
diffuse cynicism and ironic treatment of ethics and of social conventions, “as if universal 
laws existed only for the stupid, while the fatally clever smile plays on the lips of those in the 
know” (Sloterdijk 1987: 3-4). It is no surprise then that the ambivalence with its paradoxes, 
controversies and double standards is hard to pin down empirically. 
 
The implications of ambivalence for research methodologies  
 
In the majority of countries, until now, economies of favours have escaped dissection and 
analysis. In what follows I argue that the study of economies of favours requires conceptual 
innovation, methodological experimentation, and challenge of comparison, all in one way or 
another related to the issue of ambivalence. I raise my concerns, or points of self-critique, 
with regard to this agenda: no concept can perfectly reflect the substantive ambivalence of the 
economies of favours; their functional ambivalence is difficult to pin down and measure; the 
cultural and temporal relativity of specific exchanges is impossible to compare; the normative 
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ambivalence (misrecognition) is hard to work with in the field; and societies’ open secrets 
associated with economies of favours do not lend themselves easily to policy-making. 
When I did my fieldwork in Russia in the 1990s and asked people to talk to me about 
blat – Russia’s economy of favours – they smiled knowingly but then almost universally 
responded, “Why ask me?” Reassured that I only want to know “what everybody knows,” 
most of my respondents were happy to discuss blat matters frankly, talking mostly about 
others, or about the way things used to be, but eventually also coming up with personal 
stories. Understanding  of the misrecognition game and the normative ambivalence has 
informed my methodology of research on favours: speak about generic practice, not personal 
experience; let the experience trickle down through narrative; speak about others (neighbours, 
other firms, friends); speak about the past, and inquire about know-how that is no longer in 
use. It would seem that one cannot study societies’ open secrets by a straightforward tackle. 
Approaching sensitive subjects requires an observant and patient researcher, keen on details 
and willing to take detours. Detours are in fact essential and are not without paradoxes. One 
should not look for it to find it; one should go at a distance to see closer; one should use the 
“rear mirror” to move ahead; and one should get out in order to notice what was in. In other 
words, the most direct way of studying sensitive subjects is to study them indirectly. One of 
the side effects of researching an economy of favours is that one becomes unfit to participate 
in it: once its misrecognition game is analysed, it becomes impossible to play it, once its 
ambivalence is understood, the habitual use of double standards becomes inhibited. 
Reflection distorts practice. 
Studying economies of favours allows one to assess the most profound features of 
societies through seemingly trivial aspects of everyday behaviour, but it requires 
methodologies for grasping ambivalence. Sensitivities displayed in people’s accounts and 
explanations of favours provide insights into their own view of the divisive nature of favours 
and the double standards surrounding them, as well as into relationships within their 
networks. Understanding such cleavages can be hugely assisted by fortuitous historical 
circumstances. In the beginning of the 1990s, for example, it became possible to ask people 
to articulate their views on the Soviet past without constraint, just as in the 1950s, those who 
left the Soviet Union were able to describe their blat experience in the Harvard Interviewing 
Project. The collapse of the Soviet Union has made blat a matter of the past and thus enabled 
people to articulate it (Fitzpatrick 2000). Yet asking people about private matters, such as 
favours, is never in their comfort zone.   
Years of fieldwork in post-Soviet Russia has helped me to develop a ‘slow cooking’ 
methodology and assemble ethnographic evidence on hidden aspects of informality, 
strategies of misrecognition, and ambivalent qualities of economies of favours alongside 
other qualitative research. I relied on people’s willingness to share their experiences and 
started framing the most interesting ones as case studies. When I was researching Russia’s 
Economy of Favours, it was a case of a doctor, Natalia, who was an effective blat broker, 
exploiting the system but also being exploited by it. Her story exemplified the experience of 
the inner workings the Soviet economy of favours at grassroots level. In How Russia Really 
Works, it was the story of a banker, Tatiana, that best illustrated the ambivalence of the 
business practices of the 1990s, with their criminality, unlawfulness and unfairness, on the 
one hand, and their functionality for the transition, on the other (2006). As I looked for a 
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story to illustrate the profound changes that have taken place in Russia in 2000-2008, I knew 
it should be associated with the increased importance of the judiciary and Russia’s integration 
into the international legal order. I was particularly keen to explore gender aspects – the 
majority of judges are women – and their relevance to the analysis of the key feature of 
sistema. The first decade of the twenty-first century produced a ‘whistle-blowing’ trend 
among the Russian judiciary, with a number of judges speaking out about the fear they felt 
and the administrative pressure they had experienced. Several judges testified went on record 
to report that, at a higher level, influence with judges and prosecutors can yield desired 
results in criminal, commercial, and civil trials, and that, even if unfavourable judgments are 
handed down, there are ways to ensure that they are not enforced. When Olga Kudeshkina 
was dismissed from her position as a judge in the Moscow City Court for her non-compliance 
with informal commands, she took her case to the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg and won.8 Her life story has become the case study for Can Russia Modernise 
(2013a), illustrating the constraints that turn a ‘whistleblower’ of sistema defects into a 
‘traitor.’9 
Theoretically, my method connects to the ‘obliquity’ approach undertaken in John 
Kay’s study of why our goals are best achieved indirectly (Kay 2011). Kay observes that the 
happiest people do not pursue happiness; the most profitable companies are not the most 
profit-oriented; and the wealthiest people are not the most materialistic. Grant pursues a 
similar argument in the context of give and take practices (Grant 2013). Similar to those lines 
of thinking, I looked for evidence of informal power in unexpected places. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the evidence for the most secretive workings of informal power was found in 
most formal of sources – legal rulings in the public domain – and in most tangible way, the 
material culture of the Kremlin’s securitised communication network vertushka (Ledeneva 
2013a). 
In my ethnographic fieldwork, I have searched for signs of recognition of matters one 
does not need to spell out: the semi-taboos about economies of favours, the complicity to 
leave things unarticulated, the ambivalence of attitudes towards sensitive subjects. These are 
all pointers to the potentially innovative research. Observing the near ubiquitous exchange of 
knowing smiles in everyday contexts has pointed me to the niches of informality. Such 
exchanges are the basis of normality and routine interaction that is so fundamental for the 
modus operandi in societies according to Goffman (Goffman 1971:7-14, Giddens 2009: 293). 
Smiling about blat has given me a prompt to look at other open secrets and their intricate 
relationship with power (Ledeneva 2011a). I argue that economies of favours – where they 
are developed and registered in vocabularies of informality10 – constitute the societies’ open 
secrets. One might think that an open secret is not a secret at all, since it concerns things that 
‘everyone knows’, whether within a particular group or more widely in a society. This view 
                                                          
8 ECtHR ruling No 29492/05 Kudeshkina v. Russia, 26 February 2009. For details see Judge Olga B. 
Kudeshkina’s speech, 1 March 2010, ‘Deeds not words: The present failings of judicial reform in Russia’, 
www.eu-russiacentre.org/eurc/judge-olga-kudeshkinas-speech.html.  
9 See the case of Edward Snowden. ‘Russia defies US with grant of year’s asylum for Snowden’. FT Europe, 2 
August, 2013, p.1. See also (Assange 2013). 
10 Henig, D. and Macovetsky, N. CEELBAS Workshops on Vocabularies and Grammar of 
Informality, Oxford, March and May 2013. 
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would be a mistake, however, because open secrets are only partly open. Open secrets are 
secrets in the sense that they are excluded from formal or official discourse but they are open 
in the sense that they are familiar and referred to in idioms and language games, though these 
often require explanation for outsiders. Their ambivalence is a real and significant one. There 
is a tacit acceptance that what is known should remain unarticulated. Open secrets, as is 
certainly the case with double standards, occupy areas of tension, where a public affirmation 
of knowledge would threaten other values or goods that those involved want to protect. This 
point is noted in Georg Simmel’s discussion of secrecy, which reveals its complexity and 
subtlety. Simmel defines secrecy as ‘consciously willed concealment’ – open secrets are 
clearly still secrets according to this definition.  
As societies’ open secrets, economies of favour have great research potential in most 
societies. The ‘oblique’ methodology outlined above fits with the logic of triangulation – 
“attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour 
by studying it from more than one standpoint” (Cohen and Manion 2000: 254). Qualitative 
data on economies of favours should ideally be supported by other methods of “cross-
checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities in the research data” 
(O’Donoghue and Punch 2003:78). However there are inevitable obstacles to the study of 
ambivalence, whether substantive, functional or normative. 
Quantitatively, the size of economies of favours is even harder to assess than that of 
non-quantifiable forms of corruption, such as nepotism, conflict of interest, hospitality 
(Transparency International 2011). The subjectivity of value of favours, their cross-cultural 
incomparability and ambivalence makes it impossible to measure the size of economies of 
favours objectively. Rather, one could assess a spread of the phenomenon, following the 
methodology of measuring perception, as in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).11 It 
should also be possible to measure the gap between the perception of others’ use of favours 
and self-reported experience of giving and receiving favours. Given that perceptions of 
favours are ambivalent and experience is misrecognized, risks of quantification can be 
mitigated by triangulation that gives a more detailed and balanced picture of the situation. 
Given cultural specificity of economies of favours – there are often no exact translations of 
related idioms, slang, or jargon from one language to another – qualitative research is 
essential to establish the facilitating conditions, main gatekeepers, principles of inclusion and 
exclusion, multiplicity of norms, needs satisfied, degrees of obligation and codification, 
influence of kinship, tradition and religion, social inequality and other divisive narratives. 
The main challenge, however, is to create novel indicators for grasping ambivalence, 
misrecognition, doublethink, and double standards that could potentially be comparable 
across societies (Prelec 2004).  
Comparability of economies of favours can be seriously contested. Due to their substantive 
ambivalence, they are hard to study even within one setting (specificity, secretive nature, 
                                                          
11 Transparency International annual index (CPI) measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist 
among a country's public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 17 surveys from 13 
independent institutions, which has gathered the opinions of businesspeople and country analysts. The scores 
range from ten (squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). A score of five is the number TI considers the 
borderline figure distinguishing countries that do and do not have a serious corruption problem. To access the 
CPI index go to http://www.transparency.org/cpi/. For critique of the index see (Galtung 2005, Knack 2006, 
Ledeneva 2009a).    
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dependence on respondents). They are inscribed into formal frameworks – political and 
economic systems – which are themselves non-comparable and rooted in different 
historical/social contexts (Ledeneva 2008). Due to their functional ambivalence, they both 
subvert and support political and economic systems, social norms and standards of 
sociability. Due to normative ambivalence, the collected data may be difficult to interpret. 
Rather than following a coherent set of principles, provision of favours are in line with some, 
but contrary to the other, widely held norms and values, which causes the ambivalence with 
which it is regarded: it is usually condoned by some and condemned by others, and/or 
condoned and condemned by the same people, depending on a context. Innovative 
ethnographic and possibly, interdisciplinary, approaches are required to identify such subjects 
as economies of favours that can be developed further by the disciplines. 
Economies of favours have implications for many disciplines such as management 
studies (Puffer et al. 2013), informal governance (Christiansen and Neuhold 2012), legal 
anthropology (Donovan 2007); organisational studies (Yakubovich 2013); social media 
studies (Lonkila 2010, Morozov 2012) and cyber studies (Assange et al 2012). These fields 
would benefit from ethnographical perspective on economies of favours and help define 
future agendas for the interdisciplinary research. The nuances of economies of favours are so 
important that it requires almost a ‘clinical approach’ with Merton’s compassion but also 
detachment, with focus on the in-depth understanding of the case and its cultural context and 
also certain distance from it.  
A degree of marginality, associated with ethnography, being an insider but also an 
outsider of the studied societies, moving in and out of the field is essential not only for a 
research, but also for a respondent. Marginality can be an unintended consequence of the 
losing of one’s country (or the socialist idea one believed in), one’s freedom, one’s job, or 
one’s status.  For a researcher, such loss is a find. ‘Disaggregating’ concepts and specifying 
local practices, while being able to ‘inscribe’ them back into the global knowledge; creating 
novel ways of recording, registering and measuring economies of favours, while being able to 
connect to the existing datasets and indicators; maintaining the cultural relativity of 
economies of favours, while introducing a comparative dimension – all require expertise in 
ambivalence – a healthy degree of schizophrenia, as it were.  
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